Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace by Paul A. David
This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the 
 






SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 02-29 
Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace 
By 
Paul A. David 
Stanford University & 




Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
Stanford University 










The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on 
economic and public policy issues.  The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy 
analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute.  Working papers in this series reflect the views 
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research or Stanford 
University.  
 
Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace 
 
The economics of an ‘out-of-balance’ regime of 





Paul A. David 












Prepared for the Duke University School of Law Conference on 
 
International Public Goods and the Transfer of Technology 
Under a Globalized International Property Regime 
 
Held at Durham, North Carolina, 4-6








Contact author: Department of Economics, Stanford University 
  Stanford, CA. 94305-6072, USA;  E-mail: pad@stanford.edu 
    The Oxford Internet Institute, 1 St. Giles 







Koyaanisqatsi is a Hopi Indian word that translates into English as "life out of balance," "crazy 
life," "life in turmoil," "life disintegrating," all meanings consistent with indicating "a way of life which 
calls for another way of living.” While not wishing to suggest either that the international regime of 
intellectual property rights protection scientific and technical data and information is “crazy” or that it is 
“in turmoil”, this paper argues that the persisting drift of institutional change towards towards a stronger, 
more extensive and globally harmonized system of intellectual property protections during the past two 
decades has dangerously altered the balance between private rights and the public domain in data and 
information. In this regard we have embarked upon “a way of life which calls for another way of living.”  
High access charges imposed by holders of monopoly rights in intellectual property have overall 
consequences for the conduct of science that are particularly damaging to programs of exploratory 
research which are recognized to be critical for the sustained growth of knowledge-driven economies. 
Lack of restraint in privatizing the public domain in data and information has effects similar to those of 
non-cooperative behaviors among researchers in regard to the sharing of access to raw data-steams and 
information, or the systematic under-provision the documentation and annotation required to create 
reliably accurate and up-to-date public database resources. Both can significantly degrade the 
effectiveness of the research system as a whole 
The urgency of working towards a restoration of proper balance between private property rights 
and the public domain in data and information arises from considerations beyond the need to protect the 
public knowledge commons upon which the vitality of open science depends. Policy-makers who seek to 
configure the institutional infrastructure to better accommodate emerging commercial opportunities of the 
information-intensive “new economy” – in the developed and developing countries alike –therefore have 
a common interest in reducing the impediments to the future commercial exploitation of peer-to-peer 
networking technologies which are likely to be posed by ever-more stringent enforcement of intellectual 









The Argument  
 
Koyaanisqatsi is a Hopi Indian word. Almost unpronounceable for English speakers, it translates 
as "life out of balance," "crazy life," "life in turmoil," "life disintegrating," all meanings  consistent with 
indicating "a way of life which calls for another way of living.” For those who have already encountered 
this word as the title of the powerful 1983 documentary film without dialogue directed by Godfrey 
Reggio, and who therefore heard the ominous chanting of “Koyannisqatsi” over the score by Phillip 
Glass, its resonance may seem rather too doom-laden for the context in which I am invoking it on this 
occasion.
1  In truth, I do not mean to suggest either that the international regime of intellectual property 
rights protection scientific and technical data and information is “crazy” or that it is “in turmoil”.  But, I 
will argue that the persisting drift of institutional change towards towards a stronger, more extensive and 
globally harmonized system of intellectual property protections during the past two decades has 
dangerously altered the balance between private rights and the public domain in data and information; 
that in this regard we have embarked upon “a way of life which calls for another way of living.” 
 
To put the argument more concretely and specifically, I share the view of some observers that the 
emergent conjunction of statutory protections for technical systems of “self-help” for copyright holders 
and sui generis legal protection of property rights in databases does threaten the “disintegration” of a 
cornerstone of the historical regime of copyright.
2 I refer to the precept that whereas ideas, facts and their 
modes of expression “naturally” belong in the public domain, granting private parties temporary 
possession of exclusive rights to exploit these may serve important, socially beneficial purposes. Instead, 
in the increasingly “out-of-balance” regime towards which we seem to be headed, the premise that   
“information-goods” that can be fixed in digital form are “intellectual assets” and should be treated 
symmetrically with all other forms of private property, which is to say they should be subject to perpetual 
private ownership under the protection of copyright and copyright-like statutes, and technical means of 
enforcing those rights.  
 
These developments, and the latter view in particular, carry worrisome implications for the long-
run vitality of scientific and technological research, and all the societal benefits deriving therefrom. The 
advancement of knowledge is a cumulative process, one that depends on the rapid and widespread 
disclosure of new findings, so that they may be rapidly discarded if unreliable, or confirmed and brought 
into fruitful conjunction with other bodies of reliable data and information. “Open science” institutions 
provide an alternative to the intellectual property approach to dealing with difficult problems that arise in 
the production and distribution of information under competitive market conditions. Although not a 
perfect solution to those problems, and one that requires public patronage of research agents who are 
                                                            
1 See Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia (text available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License) at  
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koyaanisqatsi  [last modified 07:47 Feb 16, 2003]. The film consists mostly of slow-
motion and time-lapse footage, starting with a cave painting, progressing to footage of various natural environmental 
phenomena such as waves and cloud formations, and then to footage of man-made events including traffic formations, 
bombings, and desolate urban landscapes; it invites comparison between various natural and technological phenomena, 
by following a slow-motion images of crashing waves with those of clouds billowing around a mountainside, and an 
aerial shot of a cityscape with a closeup of a computer chip. At the film￿s end an extended sequence of a booster rocket 
slowly disintegrating as it falls to earth culminates with the presentation of a number of generally dour Hopi prophecies, 
warning against human disruption of the nature order in efforts to exploit it: "If we dig precious things from the land, 
we will invite disaster."  
 
2 See, particularly, J. H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir, ￿A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific 
Data in a Highly Protective Intellectual Property Environment.￿ Paper presented to the National Research Council 
Symposium on the Role of the Public Domain in Data and Information, held at the National Academy of Sciences (Washington, 
D.C.), 5-6 September 2000. Review draft: 6 November 2002.     
enjoined to quickly disclose and freely share information about their methods and findings, as a mode of 
generating reliable knowledge, “open science” depends upon a specific non-market reward system to 
solve a number of resource allocation problems that have their origins in the peculiar characteristics of 
information as an economic good. The collegiate reputational reward systems conventionally associated 
with open science practice in the academy and public research institutes do create conflicts been the 
ostensible norms of ‘cooperation,’ on the one hand, and on the other, the incentives it creates for non-
cooperative rivalrous behavior on the part of individuals and research units that are drawn into racing to 
establish “priority.”  Despite those sources of inefficiency in the allocation of research resources, open 
science is properly regarded as uniquely well suited to the goal of maximising the rate of growth of the 
stock of reliable knowledge.
3  
High access charges imposed by holders of monopoly rights in intellectual property have overall 
consequences for the conduct of science that are particularly damaging to programs of exploratory 
research that are recognized to be critical for the sustained growth of knowledge-driven economies. Lack 
of restraint in privatizing the public domain in data and information has effects similar to those of non-
cooperative behaviors among researchers, especially in regard to the sharing of access to raw data-steams 
and information, and the systematic under-provision the documentation and annotation required to create 
reliably accurate and up-to-date public database resources. Both can significantly degrade the 
effectiveness of the research system as a whole. Considered at the macro-level, open science and 
commercially oriented R&D based upon proprietary information constitute complementary sub-systems. 
The public policy challenge that now needs to be faced, consequently, is to keep the two sub-systems in 
proper balance. This requires not only adequate public funding of “open science” research, but deliberate 
action to halt, and in some areas reverse the excessive incursions of claims to private property rights over 
material that would otherwise remain in the public domain of scientific data and information.  
Yet, today there are many writers in the business press, academic economists, lawyers and policy 
makers who see the matter quite differently. The centrality of information technologies and information 
goods in the phenomena that are associated with the New Economy has suggested that the world has now 
leaving behind the epoch of material capitalism and entering that of “Intellectual Capitalism.” 
Accordingly, on this view, assuring the continued vitality of the market system requires in new 
institutional and technical innovations to protect intellectual property rights from the potentially 
disruptive effects of the rapid advance of digital information technologies and computer-mediated 
telecommunications.  
 
Much of the justification for that view, and hence for the sanguine and in some quarters 
enthusiastic view of recent trends in the elaboration and extension of IPR protections, rests on little 
evidence and inadequately careful economic analysis. There are a number of respects in which the new 
technological environment is increasing the seriousness of the drawbacks of using legal monopolies to 
solve the problems that the “public goods” features of information pose for competitive markets.  The 
urgency of working towards a restoration of proper balance between private property rights and the 
public domain in data and information arises from considerations beyond the need to protect the public 
knowledge commons upon which the vitality of open science depends. Economists lately have come 
around to the view that the “public goods problems” which recently have been heightened by the 
dramatically falling costs of reproducing and distributing digital information, may, for related reasons, 
also have become more manageable under market competition without recourse to copyright and 
copyright-like protections. Protections for producers of “the first copy” from “unfair dealing” constitutes 
                                                            
3   For further development of these points, which are not treated extensively in this essay, see Paul A. David, ￿The 
Economic Logic of  ￿Open Science￿ and the Balance between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain  
in Scientific Data and Information : A Primer,￿, Paper presented to the National Research Council Symposium on the 
Role of the Public Domain in Scientific and Technical Data and Information, held at the National Academy of Sciences 
(Washington, D.C.), 5-6 September 2000. Final draft:     
an alternative approach to copyright, and one that is more directly responsive to the economics issues of 
unfair competition that have beset publishers from the era of Gutenberg onwards. On that reading, policy-
makers who seek to configure the institutional infrastructure to better accommodate emerging 
commercial opportunities of the information-intensive “new economy” – in the developed and 
developing countries alike – may have a common interest in reducing the impediments to the future 
commercial exploitation of peer-to-peer networking technologies which are likely to be posed by ever-
more stringent enforcement of intellectual property rights.  
 
The following sections of this paper adumbrate and elaborate on this argument, beginning with 
the economics of information and taking notice of the existence of alternative solutions to the problems 
of appropriating value in the case of commodities that have the properties of public goods.  
  
 
Knowledge, Information Economics and the “Three P’s” 
 
  Knowledge may be viewed as a commodity. But, it is not a commonplace commodity. Nor is 
information, which we may distinguish from the cognitive human capabilities subsumed under the label 
of ‘knowledge.” Through the process of codification, some, but not all forms of knowledge, can be 
reduced to information, which renders it more readily transmitted, classified and stored. Even so, 
information, like knowledge remains highly differentiated, and not being homogeneous it has no obvious 
natural units of measurement.  It can have utility as a pure consumption good or as a capital good, and 
often as both.  It is unusual in that, as a pure capital good yielding a stream of material benefits when 
combined with other kinds of assets, information and knowledge possess intrinsic values.  Such is the 
case, for example, with regard to information about the operation of a cost-saving manufacturing process, 
or the design of a product with better quality attributes. 
 
  A property still more remarkable than those already noticed is information's extreme indivisibility, 
coupled with its durability: once a a bit of knowledge has been obtained, there is no value to acquiring it a 
second time,  or a  third.  There is no societal need to repeat the same discovery or invention, because a 
piece of information can be used again and again without exhausting it. Related to this, and of even 
greater import, knowledge differs from ordinary "private" commodities in being what economists refer to 
as a non-rival  good: it can  be possessed  and enjoyed jointly by as many as care to make use of it.  While 
this observation forms the point of departure of the classic analysis of the economics of R&D due to 
Kenneth Arrow (1962), it hardly can be claimed as a modern insight. 
 
  Consider the following passage in a letter written in 1813 to Isaac McPherson, a Baltimore 
inventor, by Thomas Jefferson:
4  
 
"If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is 
the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess 
as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the 
possession of every one, and  the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.  Its peculiar 
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of 
it.  He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; 
as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.  That ideas should 
freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of 
man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently 
designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without 
                                                            
4 A. Koch and W. Peden, eds., The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, New York: Modern Library Editions,  1972: 
pp. 629-630.     
lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have 
our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation." 
 
It seems clear that Jefferson grasped the essential point that the cost of transmitting useful knowledge in 
codified form is negligible in comparison to the costs of creating it; and saw that were it not for society's 
need to encourage the pursuit of ideas by rendering such pursuits economically viable, such information 
should be distributed freely.
5  
 
Non-rival possession, low marginal cost of reproduction and distribution which makes it difficult 
to exclude others from access, and substantial fixed costs of original production, are the three properties 
familiarly associated with the definition of a "public good".   As is well known, when these characteristics 
are present competitive markets -- in which price tends to be driven down to the costs of supplying the 
marginal unit of the commodity -- in general perform quite badly; competitive producer's revenues will 
not even cover their full costs of production, much less appropriate anything approaching the use value of 
the goods to the public.  Indeed, the attempt to make the beneficiaries pay for value received would so 
reduce demand as to result in an inefficiently low level of its  consumption. 
 
In the literature of public finance economics, three principal alternative allocative mechanisms 
are proposed as solutions to "the public goods problem". One is that society should provide independent 
producers with subsidies financed by general taxation, and require that the goods be made available to the 
public freely or at a nominal charge.  A second mechanism would have the state levying general taxes to 
finance its direct participation in the process of production and distribution, furnishing and managing the 
requisite facilities, and contracting where necessary with private agents to carry out this work.  Here, 
again, the objective is to supply the good without having to charge prices for it.  The third solution is to 
create a publicly regulated private monopoly, which would be able to charge consumers prices that will 
secure a "normal" rate of profit.  This does not guarantee that consumers will be lined up to purchase the 
goods and services in question.  In other words, the legal right to exclude other producers from the market 
for a product does not, in and of itself, create a profitable monopoly of that line of business. 
  While the elements of non-excludabilty and “non-rivalry” that are present in information qualifies 
this commodity to be regarded as a “public good” for purposes of economic policy analysis, ideas and 
information remain distinguished in two respects from the mass of conventional public goods, such as 
traffic lights, flood control systems, airport beacons and radar landing beams, and the like.  The first 
difference is that the attributes of the commodity -- i.e., typically, the complete contents of the 
information itself -- will not be known beforehand.  Indeed, it is not known automatically to all the 
interested parties even when the new knowledge becomes available in codified form.  This asymmetry in 
the distribution of information greatly complicates the process of arranging contracts for the production 
and use of new knowledge. 
 
   The second differentiating feature is the cumulative and interactive nature of knowledge .  It is 
particularly evident that the stock of scientific and technological knowledge grows by incremental 
                                                            
5 This does not mean that knowledge of all kinds can be transferred a low marginal costs. Uncodified knowledge, which 
in many instances resists codification and remains ￿tacit￿ is more difficult to transmit between agents, except through 
personal communications that take the form of demonstrations. On the implications of  tacitness in regard to science 
and technology policies, and the economics of codification of knowledge, see, e.g., R. Cowan, P. A. David and D. Foray, 
￿The explicit economics of codification and tacit knowledge,￿ Industrial and Corporate Change, , 9(2), (Summer) 2000: pp. 
211-253.   
additions, each advance building upon and sometimes altering the significance of previous findings in 
complicated, and often unpredictable ways.
6 
 
The importance of the foregoing differentiating features notwithstanding, it is useful to notice a 
striking correspondence between the three solutions for the standard public goods problem -- subsidies, 
direct production, and regulated monopoly -- and the three main institutional arrangements that may be 
deployed to address the so-called “appropriability problem” to which the public goods characteristics of 
information gives rise.  In order to encourage the provision of public goods in the shape of scientific and 
technological knowledge, modern states typically are found to be deploying several of these concurrently. 
For the sake of brevity, I have referred on previous occasions to the three principal institutional devices as 
“the three P’s”: public Patronage, the legal exclusive ownership of (intellectual) Property, and 
Procurement by State agencies through contracting arrangements.
7 Each of these mechanisms, however, 
exhibits some special deficiencies as well as some specific virtues in its effects upon resource allocation; 
none among them offers a perfect solution to the problem. We focus here on intellectual property rights, 
and examine the virtues and deficiencies of in the less often discussed case of the protections afforded by 
the copyright system.  
 
  The term "patronage" stands for the system of awarding publicly financed prizes, research grants 
based upon the submission of competitive proposals,  and other subsidies to private individuals and 
organizations engaged in intellectual discovery and invention, in exchange for full public disclosure of 
their creative achievements.  It may be said to characterize the pursuit of "open" scientific inquiry, and  
the dominant institutional and social mode of organization associated in the western democratic societies 
with the conduct of academic science.  
 
  "Procurement" is associated with governmental contracting for intellectual work, the products of 
which it will control and devote to public purposes.  Whether or not the information thereby produced 
will be laid open for public use is a secondary issue, albeit an important matter for public policy.   
"Sensitive" defence-related research usually is conducted under government auspices in secure, closed 
laboratories; whereas, much public contract R&D, and the scientific work of governmentally managed 
laboratories and (agricultural) experiment stations, is undertaken with the intention of wide dissemination 
of the findings. 
 
    The third arrangement is for society to grant private producers of new knowledge exclusive 
property rights to the use of their creations, thereby forming conditions for the existence of markets in 
these forms intellectual property, and enabling the originators to collect (differential) fees for the use of 
their work by others. Here, under the Property rubric, are found the specific legal contrivances of the 
patent and  copyright, and, somewhat more problematically, the trade secret. 
 
 
                                                            
6 Thomas Jefferson remarked upon this, too:"The fact is, that one new idea leads to another, that to a third, and so on 
through a course of time until someone, with whom no one of these ideas was original, combines all together, and 
produces what is justly called an new invention." (Jefferson/Koch and Peden 1972: p. 686) 
7 See, e.g., P. A. David, ￿Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda￿s Thumb:  Patents, Copyrights, and Trade 
Secrets in Economic Theory and History," in Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, (M. 
Wallerstein, M. Mogee, and R. Schoen, eds.), Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993), esp. pp. 226 ff. On the 
connection between patronage institutions and the conduct of ￿open science￿, see, e.g., P. A. David, ￿Common Agency 
Contracting and the Emergence of ￿Open Science￿ Institutions,￿ American Economic Review, 88(2), May 1998.     
Intellectual Property Rights Protections in Economic Theory and History 
The creation and assigning of intellectual property rights convey a monopoly right to the 
beneficial economic exploitation of an idea (in the case of patent rights) or of a particular expression of an 
idea (in the case of copyright) in return for the disclosure of the idea or its expression. This device allows 
the organisation of market exchanges of “exploitation rights,” which, by assigning pecuniary value to 
commercially exploitable ideas, creates economic incentives for people to go on creating new ones, as 
well as finding new applications for old ones. By allocating these rights to those who are prepared to pay 
the most for them, the workings of intellectual property markets also tend to prevent ideas from remaining 
in the exclusive (secret) possession of discoverers and inventors who might be quite uninterested in 
seeing their creations used to satisfy the wants and needs of other members of society. 
Thus a potential economic problem that is addressed by instituting a system of intellectual 
property rights is the threat that unfair competition, particularly the misappropriation of the benefits of 
someone else’s expenditure of effort, may destroy the provision of information-goods as a commercially 
viable activity. The nub of the problem here is that the cost of making a particular information good 
available to a second, third, or thousandth user are not significantly greater than those of making it 
available to the first one. Ever since the Gutenberg revolution, the technical advances that have lowered 
the costs of reproducing “encoded” material (text, images, sounds) also has permitted “pirates” to 
appropriate the contents of the first copy without bearing the expense of its development. Unchecked, this 
form of unfair competition could render unprofitable the investment entailed in obtaining that critical first 
copy.  
Producers of ideas, texts, and other creative works (including graphic images and music) are 
subject to economic constraints, even when they do not invariably respond to variation in the incentives 
offered by the market.  If they had no rights enabling them to derive income from the publication of their 
works, they might create less, and quite possibly be compelled to spend their time doing something 
entirely different but more lucrative. So, there is an important economic rationale for establishing 
intellectual property rights. 
To summarize, the “property” solution, which creates rights the fruits of intellectual creations, 
possesses a number of definite virtues. These may be quickly adumbrated for the case of patents: 
•  The patent provides an obvious and recognised solution to the economic problem of the 
intellectual creator. By increasing the expected private returns from innovation, it acts as an incentive 
mechanism to private investment in knowledge production.  
•  Patents facilitate the market test of new invention because they allow disclosure of the 
related information while (in principle) protecting against imitation. 
•  Patents create transferable rights (by granting a license, the owner of the knowledge 
allows it to be exploited by other agents) and, therefore, it can help to structure a complex transaction 
that also concerns unpatented knowledge.  
•  Patents are a means to signal and evaluate the future value of the technological effort of 
the companies that own them (which is particularly useful in the cases of new or young companies for 
which other classes of “intangibles” cannot be used for proper evaluation). 
•  This way of providing market incentives for certain kinds of creative effort leaves the 
valuation of the intellectual production to be determined ex post, by the willingness of users to pay; it 
thereby avoids having society try to place a value on the creative work ex ante – as would be required 
under alternative incentive schemes, such as offering prospective authors and inventors prizes, or 
awarding individual procurement contracts for specified works. 
But, establishing a monopoly right to exploit that “first copy” (the idea protected by the patent or 
the expressive material protected by copyright), alas, turns out not to be a perfect one. The monopolist   
will raise the price of every copy above the negligible costs of its reproduction, and, as a result, there will 
be some potential users of the information good who will be excluded from enjoying it. The latter 
represents a waste of resources, referred to by economists as the “deadweight burden of monopoly”: some 
people’s desires will remain unsatisfied even though they could have been fulfilled at virtually no 
additional cost. 
 This is but one of the things that are likely to go awry in the case of patent protection, as may be 
seen from the list of “vices” that is appended to the “virtues” of patent, for, as is quite well known, the 
first to invent and first to file basis for awarding patents creates incentives for duplicative “races” that 
result in socially excessive R&D expenditures. Similarly, patents may be  sought and used strategically as 
tools to raise rivals costs by confronting them with the threat, if not the actuality of   infringement suits.  
A corresponding catalogue of “virtues” and “vices” can be given in the instance of copyright (as in the 
Text Box that follows).   
Not surprisingly, then, the subject of intellectual property policies has proved troublesome for the 
economics profession, as it presents numerous situations in which the effort to limit unfair competition 
and provide adequate “market incentives” for innovation demonstrably may result in a socially inefficient 
resource allocation. Human institutions, however, rarely are perfect. From both the viewpoints of legal 
theory and economic analysis there is therefore much to be said for regarding patent and copyright 
institutions as remarkably ingenious social contrivances, whereby protection of the discoverer’s or 
inventor’s exclusive right to exploit new knowledge commercially is exchanged for the disclosure of 





















Economic Virtues and Vices of Copyright Protection 
 
Analytical justification: Copyright protection addresses the problem of 
high fixed (first copy) cost and low marginal cost. In conventional 
applications where text and images were embodied in physical 
media, registration secured disclosure of original expressive works. 
Virtues: 
♦  Incentives for creative productions 
♦  Reward for derivative innovation benefit s (‘droite de suivre’ 
principle rewards bias towards breadth/development 
potential) 
♦  Versioning’ permits price discrimination based on urgency of 
demand for information 
Vices: 
♦  ‘Deadweight’ burden of monopoly, heavy for ‘minority taste’ 
users 
♦  ‘Super-inefficiencies’ when applied to network goods 
(especially compatibility standards, interface standards) 
♦  Impediments to cumulative innovation, unless mitigated by 
‘fair use’ exclusions 
♦  Inhibits development of modular system innovation (e.g., 
software system design)    
 
additional discoveries and inventions.
8 All of which, moreover, is managed by leaving the economic 
value of the right to be determined by the workings of the market, and thereby removing it from the realm 
of political discretion. 
Yet, it ought not to be supposed that the actual provisions of the laws affecting intellectual 
property rights fully honor this social bargain. True, no patent is valid that does not describe the invention 
in “clear, precise, and exact terms,” thereby disclosing sufficient information to enable second-comers to 
practice the invention without “undue experimentation.” American patent law is unusual in going farther 
than this, in requiring the patent applicants to disclose the best mode in which they contemplate 
implementing their invention. But, in practice these provisions often prove insufficient to overcome the 
effects of the economic incentives that patentees usually have to withhold some pertinent information, 
either for their private use or as a basis to extract additional rents for the transfer of know-how that is 
complementary to that disclosed by the patent. 
Delays in the release of information add to the academic research community’s concerns over the 
way that the workings of the patent system restrict access to new scientific and technological findings. 
U.S. patent law follows the principle that priority in invention, rather than being first to file a patent 
application is what matters; it therefore allows applicants a one-year grace period after publication. But 
most foreign systems award patents on a “first to file” basis, which means that even American researchers 
are induced – by their own or their supporting organization’s commercial goals – to delay publication of 
their findings and inventions until they have prepared patent applications to secure rights in other 
countries. During the two decades following the passage of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, which authorized 
universities in the U.S. to seek patents on innovations arising from federally funded research projects, 
there has been more-or-less continuous modification of institutional rules in the direction of lengthening 
the permissible duration of delays placed on the publication of research findings for purposes of allowing 
the filing of patent applications.
9 
From the standpoint of academic researchers the greatest deficiency of the statutory disclosure 
requirements imposed by patent laws is simply that little scientific or technical data may be divulged in 
meeting this stipulation, so that the patent itself is of only limited interest and serves mainly as a notice 
that the patentees may be willing to supply more useful information, for some fee. Moreover, researchers’ 
ability to make use of such information as the patent does divulge is by no means assured until the end of 
its life; the patent not only excludes others from selling the invention, but also prohibits them from 
making and using it. That the use of an invention for purposes of research, and hence in generating further 
discoveries and innovations, ought not be proscribed has long been recognized by patent case law in the 
U.S: researchers have been allowed to defend themselves from infringement suits on grounds of 
“experimental use” – so long as the infringer is able to show that no commercial benefit was derived 
thereby.
10 
                                                            
8 For the legal and economic interpretations, respectively, see, e.g., Eisenberg (1989), and Dasgupta and David (1987, 
1994), David (1994).  
9 The effects of the Bayh-Dole legislation (U.S.C. §§200-211: 291-307) on university patenting activity are reviewed by 
Mowery and Nelson (1998); Cohen, Florida and Goe (1996) report findings from a survey of U.S. university-industry 
research centers on the distribution of permitted restraints on publication to allow for the filing of patent applications, 
and the significance of these delays and other restrictions is discussed by David (1995).  
10 Dam (1999: pp. 7-8) points out that because the case law has tended to reject the ￿experimental use￿ defense against 
infringement suits whenever the researcher might profit, this exception to patent protection is less likely to prove 
beneficial for academic researchers in fields like biomedical sciences, where even publicly-funded ￿basic￿ research may 
yield short-term economic payoffs. Given the case law precedents in the U.S., the drive on the part of university 
administrators to exploit patent rights under the provisions of the 1980 Bahy-Dole Act may thus be seen as contributing   
  The same situation does not arise with conventional copyright protection, since what is being 
protected is the published form in which ideas have been expressed; only that which is fully disclosed can 
qualify the author for legal protection against infringers. Inasmuch as it is difficult, if not impossible to 
establish that unauthorized copies were made of a text which had not been made public in some way, 
authors seeking legal protection for their work have every incentive to hasten its disclosure. Moreover, in 
recognition of the cultural and scientific benefits of exegetical and critical writings, and further research 
based upon published information and data – not to mention the interests of authors in having such usage 
made on the basis of accurate representations of their work – statutory exceptions traditionally are 
provided to permit “fair use” infringements of copyrighted material. Largely for these reasons, this form 
of intellectual property protection historically has not raised serious objections on the grounds of 
impeding rapid access to new scientific or technological data and information. But, the situation has 
changed. 
Forces behind the Recent “Policy Push” for a Stronger Global IPR Regime 
 
The economic prominence of intellectual property, and concerns to strengthen the legal 
protections afforded patents, copyrights and trademarks, have been rising in recent years. The value of 
intellectual property is increasing as a share of average total firm value; the number of patent applications 
is growing at double-digit rates in the major patent offices; and licensing and cross-licensing are being 
employed with greater frequency than ever, particularly so in high-technology industries. 
The greater intensity of innovation, characteristic of the knowledge-based economy, and the 
increase in the propensity to patent (that is, the elevation of the ratio number of patents/number of 
innovations or number of patents per real R&D spending), which indicates the emergence of new research 
and innovation management techniques, are the main factors of this quantitative evolution.
11 147,000 U.S. 
utility patents were granted in 1998, corresponding to an increase of 32% compared to 1997. Over the 
past 10 years both patent applications and patent grants have increased at a rate of about six per cent per 
annum, compared to about one per cent per annum in the preceding forty years.  
There is a qualitative aspect to the growth of patenting as well. Patents are being registered on 
new types of objects such as software (17,000 patents last year, compared to 1,600 in 1992), genetic 
creations and devices for electronic trade over the Internet, and by new actors (universities, researchers in 
the public sector). This general trend is also reflected in the increase in exclusivity rights over 
instruments, research materials and databases. While all of this may be seen as contributing to a dramatic 
expansion of “the knowledge market,”
12 the proliferation of exclusive rights on whole areas of intellectual 
creation, equally, represents an unpredecentedly large incursion upon the public domain of scientific and 
technical data and information.. 
Many factors explain this trend. A first factor is simply that patent is becoming an intangible asset 
of increasing importance: for new and/or small companies because this is sometimes the only reliable way 
to signal their value to the market, and more broadly, for any firm involved in innovation-based 
competition. A second factor is the increasing value of strategic use of patents as bargaining chips: with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indirectly as well as directly to creating more formidable barriers to the ability of academic researchers to rapidly access 
new research tools and results. 
11 See, Sam Kortum and Josh Lerner, ￿Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What Is Behind the Recent 
Surge in Patenting?,￿ Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 48, 1998: pp. 247-304. 
12 See Arora et al., 1999.   
the current (or expected) strengthening of national and regional legal systems of intellectual property, the 
expected benefits of amassing portfolios of legal rights to exclude began to outweigh their costs.
13 
The third factor deals with changes in patenting policy in the US and Europe. Patenting policy 
decided by the patent offices and courts deals obviously with the interpretation of the three basic 
patentability criteria. They always played a role of regulation, blocking or slowing down private 
appropriation in certain fields. Today, pro-patenting policies of patent offices mean that patentability 
criteria have gradually been eased and extended to new subject matter areas. Many research results 
become patentable, as a result of both legal (court) and patent office decisions. The increasing ability to 
patent fundamental knowledge, research tools and data bases is part and parcel of a broader movement 
towards strengthening IPRs. 
Other important factors relate to changes at the institutional level: 
•  Powerful commitments to basic research by private firms in certain sectors (for instance, 
the case in the genomics area where we can observe the emergence of a new generation of firms which 
are highly specialised in fundamental research and are, therefore, in direct competition with the public 
research institutions). 
•  Changes in the behavior of universities and public institutes have contributed 
significantly to increased patenting in the U.S., particularly in the biotechnology and medical devices 
fields; more generally universities have become more and more oriented towards exploiting the 
intellectual property system as a means of capturing revenue [Henderson et al. 1998], and 
demonstrating a commitment to the promotion of economic development in their regions [Feller 
1997]. 
•  Privatization of some of the activities of governmental civilian agencies which become 
major players in the contractual research market [Jaffe and Lerner 1999].  
These trends do not necessarily lead to an excess of privatization of knowledge. In many cases 
the establishment of intellectual property rights strengthens private incentives, allows the commitment of 
substantial private resources, and thereby improves the conditions of commercialization of inventions. 
Moreover, the establishment of private rights does not totally prevent the diffusion of knowledge, even if 
it does limit it. Finally, a large proportion of private knowledge is disseminated outside the market 
system, either within consortia or by means of networks of trading and sharing of knowledge, the 
foundation of the unintentional spillovers discussed by several authors [e.g., von Hippel 1988, and David 
2001b].  
Nevertheless, there is some concern when all these developments show a general shift from one 
view to another of the role of IPRs [Steinmueller 2001]: traditionally, IPRs are considered as one of the 
incentive structures society employs to elicit innovative effort. They co-exist with other incentive 
structures, each of which has costs and benefits as well as a degree of complementarity. The new view is 
that IPRs are the only means to commodify the intangible capital represented by knowledge and should 
therefore be a common currency or ‘ruler’ for measuring the output of activities devoted to knowledge 
generation and the basis for markets in knowledge exchange. 
The restructuring of the legal regimes relating to patents and copyrights, and the adjustments of 
behavior to the new incentives created by those institutional  innovations are likely to impact the   
                                                            
13 See Bronwyn H. Hall and Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, ￿The patent paradox revisited: an emprical study of patenting in 
the U.S. seminconductor industry, 1979-1995,￿ RAND Journal of Economics, 32(1), Spring 2001: pp. 101-128,  for the 
defensive use of patent portfolios in an industry that prior to the 1980￿s has been characterised by low propensity to 
patent.    
organization and conduct of scientific research and publishing. Indeed, they seem bound to figure among 
the more prominent unexpected consequences of the very same digital infrastructure technologies that 
were created by publicly sponsored scientists and engineers. Unfortunately, at least some of these 
repercussions now appear to be detrimental to the long-term vitality of the practice of “open” science in 
the world’s academic research communities. Such an untoward effect will not follow from the technology 
itself. It comes, instead, from the lack of appropriate concern for maintaining a healthy balance between 
the domain of publicly supported knowledge production and exchanges, and the sphere in which flourish 
private, proprietary R&D and profitable businesses based upon information goods. 
One source of difficulty in preserving such balance is quite immediately apparent. An attractive 
short-run strategy of business development entails utilizing enhanced information processing and 
telecommunications in conjunction with the assertion of private property rights over the mass of publicly 
provided data and information products. Rather than having to produce wholly new content for 
distribution via the new and more effective technical facilities, an obvious first line of enterprise is to 
make use of what comes freely and most readily to hand. Ever since the introduction of printing with 
moveable type, the history of new publication and broadcast media has shown how automatic it is for 
entrepreneurs to seek first to draw upon content that was already available in the public domain. 
Hence, one can expect that this approach will continue to be tried, exploiting larger and larger 
portions of the body of codified scientific knowledge and observational data that has been built up under 
public patronage and maintained as a common, readily accessible research resource. Sometimes the 
commercialization of public databases makes good economic sense: because private firms may have 
technical or marketing capabilities that would add value for a variety of end users of publicly generated 
data, whereas existing government agencies or NGOs lack that competence. Such was shown to be the 
case in regard to the distribution and packaging by commercial weather information services of data 
gathered by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
14  
But, the possibility of seriously adverse consequences elsewhere in the national research system, 
from ill-designed policies and programs to promote proprietary exploitation of public knowledge 
resources, also needs to be recognized. Consider what ensued in those circumstances from the Reagan 
Administration's sponsorship of the Land-Remote Sensing Commercialization Act (1984), under which 
the responsibility for the operations of the Landsat system of remote sensing satellites was transferred 
from NOAA management, and a monopoly on Landsat images was awarded in 1985 to the Earth 
Observation Satellite (EOSAT) Company, a joint venture of Hughes and RCA. The price of Landsat 
images immediately rose 10-fold, from $400 per image to $4000. This permitted EOSAT to attract 
profitable business from commercial customers and the federal government, although virtually none from 
academic and independent researchers. Indeed, the impact of the privatization of Landsat operations upon 
basic research being conducted by university groups around the world was quite devastating, as, they 
suddenly went from being “data rich” into a condition not of actual “data poverty” so much as one of data 
“non-entitlement.”
15  
The EOSAT Co. secured its monopoly position in the market for satellite images by virtue of 
being given physical control over the source of (Landsat) images. Yet it is equally possible to imagine 
that a similarly damaging outcome for academic researchers would follow from the exercise of the market 
power that a commercial provider of a scientific database might gain under intellectual property 
                                                            
14 See National Research Council (1997), pp. 116-124, for material underlying this and the following discussion.      
15 The introduction here of the term ￿non-entitlement￿ is a deliberate allusion to Amartya Sen￿s observation that people 
starved in the Indian famine of 1918 not because the harvest was inadequate to feed them, but because the rise in grain 
prices had deprived them of ￿entitlement￿ to the food that actually was available.    
protection; especially under a legal regime that granted indefinitely renewable copyright protection to the 
database contents, whether or not the data was otherwise copyrightable.
16 
 The  recent extension of copyright to software has itself permitted a breach of the disclosure 
principle that parallels the one already noted in regard to patents. Under American copyright law (in order 
to qualify to pursue infringers for damages) it is sufficient to register only some sample extracts of a 
computer program’s “text,” rather than the entire body of code. Moreover, there is no requirement 
whatsoever to disclose the underlying “source code”; copyright protection can be obtained on the basis of 
a disclosure of just the machine language instructions, which, even were they to be divulged in their 
entirety would be difficult and costly to interpret and re-utilize without access to the source code. While 
this practice surely can be seen to violate the principle that no burden of “undue experimentation” should 
be placed upon second comers, the latter requirement is one that holds only in the case of patent law. It 
never was contemplated that one might be able to register a text for full copyright protection without 
practically disclosing its contents to interested readers. 
A further, more generally disconcerting set of developments may prove quite destructive to the 
effectiveness of traditional safeguards against “fair use” exemptions for research (and educational) 
purposes – even where such provisions continue to be made. This threat has emerged only recently in the 
form of digital technologies that limit “on line” copying of electronic information. Advanced encryption 
systems now underpin many computing and communications security services, and permit a wide variety 
of security objectives to be achieved by establishing discretionary control over access to encrypted data, 
along with assurance for both users and service provider of message authentication and data integrity, as 
well as privacy and confidentiality goals. There are other techniques for marking and monitoring the use 
of distributed digital information, such as “water marking,” which attaches a signal to digital data that can 
be detected or extracted later to make documentable assertions about its provenance, authenticity, or 
ownership; “fingerprinting” embeds a mark in each copy that uniquely identifies the authorized recipient. 
“Self help” or “copyright management” systems that make use of encryption or prevent 
unauthorized copying of “cleartext” allow copyright holders to enforce their legal claim to capture 
economic value from users of the protected material, and, moreover enable selective access to elements of 
content that makes it more feasible for the vendor to engage in price discrimination. Marking and 
monitoring techniques, in contrast, do not allow direct enforcement of copyrights, but can be used to deter 
unauthorized copying and distribution of information by facilitating tracking of errant data to the original 
recipients who were responsible for its improper use. 
These advances in digital technology have a direct economic effect that is efficiency enhancing, 
insofar as they reduce the costs of enforcing a statutory property right and thereby securing whatever 
societal benefits copyright legislation is designed to promote. Yet, in the currently prevailing enthusiasm 
for stronger intellectual property protection, the American drafters of the 1998 Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act included a provision that prohibits the circumvention of “any technological measure that 
effectively controls access” to a copyrighted work, and outlawed the manufacture, importation or public 
distribution of any technology primarily produced for the purpose of such circumvention.
17 The problem 
posed by this statutory reinforcement for applications of novel self-help technologies is simply that it may 
render impossible the exercise “fair use” of copyrighted material by researchers and educators, leaving 
the provision of information access for such purposes as a matter for the discretion of copyright holders.  
                                                            
16 It will be seen (from the discussion below) that such also may be the import of the European Commission￿s Directive 
on the Legal Protection of Databases, issued on March 11 1996. 
 
17 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998), United States Code, 17, §1201; also, Dam (1998) for discussion of the 
policy issues raised by self-help systems.    
This, however, is not the only serious assault upon the traditional means of permitting publicly 
supported open science communities to pursue their work untrammeled by the protections afforded to 
copyright owners. As attractive as the prospect of more powerful “self help” technologies may appear to 
be in curtailing “digital piracy,” such remedies would create a threat to the achievement of a reasonably 
regime for the allocation of scientific and technological information goods while providing protection for 
private investments in information goods. One way in which it is feasible to approximate the efficient 
workings of a system of discriminatory pricing for data and information is to allow educators, scholars 
and researchers to invoke “fair use” exemptions from the requirements for licensing material that is 
copyrighted or otherwise legally protected by statute. In effect, this approach would set differentially 
lower prices for the use of information goods in producing and distributing knowledge – indeed, prices 
that approximate the negligibly small marginal costs of digital reproduction and transmission. 
But, so far we have considered only the most straightforward and obvious of the potentially 
adverse consequences of turning over parts of the public knowledge domain to information monopolists. 
The staking out of property rights to scientific knowledge has potentially serious and subtler implications 
for the circulation of information and its use in research. These may be grouped, for the sake of 
convenience, under the general heading of “transaction costs increases.” Firstly, it is possible that IPR-
related transaction costs may increase so much that the result can be the blockage of knowledge 
exploitation and accumulation. Policy makers and academics alike have focused especially on the tragedy 
of the anticommons in biotechnology and microprocessors the potentially deleterious effect of strong IP 
protection for databases on academic science, and the extension of patentability to new subject such as 
patents, and more recently business methods.
18 
 Secondly, efforts and costs devoted to sorting out conflicting and overlapping claims to IPR will 
increase as will uncertainty about the nature and extent of legal liability in using knowledge inputs. Again 
policy makers and academics are concerned with the increase of litigation costs, including indirect costs, 
which may distort the innovative behavior of small companies.
19 As put well by John Barton (2000), there 
is a problem when “the number of intellectual property lawyers is growing faster than the amount of 
research.” And this is what happens in the U.S. while similar trends in Europe show that this is no longer 
a purely American problem.  
 
ICTs, “Weightless” Goods and Services, and Databases in the New Economy 
 
  The 20
th century witnessed a transition to “knowledge-driven” productivity gains and economic 
growth in the industrially advanced economies, at process that spread within a widening circle among the 
late-comers to industrialisation. All economic activity is, and always has been knowledge-based , in the 
sense that the state of the arts in production, the conventions of commerce, and the norms of consumption 
all entail possession of information and cognitive skills. In the knowledge-driven economy, by contrast, 
the continuous search for new, reliable knowledge and the generation and absorbing of new information 
are centrally responsible for structural change and material progress, and the focus of attention in the 
search for improved efficiency moved from perfecting the management of routine to sustaining the 
capacity for problem-identification and –solution.  
 
  Accordingly, and increasing share of society’s domestic resources comes to be devoted to 
activities of the latter sort, in whose course which heterogeneous intangible knowledge- assets are formed 
and recombined to generate further knowledge-assets. Recent decades have seen a significant acceleration 
                                                            
18 On these points, see Heller and Eisenberg [1998], Hall and Ziedonis [ 2001]; David [2000]; and Samuelson [1993, 
1999], and Cockburn [2001], respectively. 
19 See, e.g.,  Lerner [1995].   
in the pace of this historical transition. This developmental surge has been quite evidently associated with 
the dramatic advances in ICT, especially with the progress of digital computing and its convergence with 
telecommunications. The cluster of innovations – very large integrated circuits on silicon wafter, digital 
switches, electro-optical networks, and computer operating systems and applications – that has made 
possible the phenomenon of the Internet, can be conceptualized as a having provided a new and potent 
general purpose technology (GPT). This is a tool set that may be utilized in many way; combining with, 
transforming, and thereby enhancing the productivity and profitablity of other, pre-existing technologies 
and organizational modes, the digital GPT cluster is not displacing “the old economy” but instead 
manifesting its potential for “renewal.”  
 
  A central feature common to the multiplicity of diverse processes of economic renewal that 
presently are underway is their intensified dependence upon the generation, capture, processing, 
transmission, storage and retrieval of information.  The spectacularly declining costs of performing those 
activities promotes this intensification, and induces the search for still newer uses toward the 
accumulating bodies of information can be put in order to form the capabilities that we refer to as 
“knowledge” – which included the capacity to find – or impose - order (information) in the myriad 
streams of data that now can be captured and subjected to systematic analysis.  The collection of data and 
the preservation of information extracted from them hardly are new human activities. But the great 
reduction in the technologically mandated costs, and the enhanced accuracy and scale upon which this can 
now be done challenges the capacities of individual human beings to attend to, and focus upon the signals 
that are likely to prove significant.  
 
It is for this reason, as well as the greatly increased technical ease of data capture and 
manipulation, that distributed databases and the tools to work with them have grown increasingly 
prominent on the landscape of the digitally “renewed economy.” The knowledge-driven society is coming 
to rely more heavily upon, and find new and more productive uses for the rather mundane entities that we 
call “databases.” These objects are in a sense paradigmatic of the enhanced role, and social value that 
“information assets” of all sorts are coming to acquire in modern, digital economy.  
 
Of course, scientific and scholarly inquiry has long created collections of objects, and 
observations, as a means of preserving materials that could form the basis of later study and forming the 
necessary support for the collective memory that allows the cumulative advancement of knowledge. In 
former times scientific databases were comparatively small (10 kilobytes), and feasible for individuals 
and small groups of researchers to compile, annotate and maintain by labor intensive methods; they often 
were published as typeset tables or simple, on-line documents.  Recently, however, the size and 
complexity of scientific databases has growth enormously, and with that the potentialities of exploiting 
that data also have mounted. The necessary activities are absorbing increasing resources from publicly 
funded research programs in science and engineering, and there has been a commensurate expansion of in 
the pressure upon researchers to find ways of extracting revenues from these “assets,” so as to defray the 
costs of creating and maintaining them. In some degree, that pressure reflects the perception that the 
commercial database business can be a lucrative one.  
   
Thus, it is pertinent to notice that the development and “on line” databases have been 
proliferating in the world of business as well, and for many of the same reasons. Yet, the rapid growth of 
the commercial database industry in the U.S. during the 1990’s, summarised by the statistics in the 
following Table,  might be seen as presenting something of a puzzle to those who regard the necessity of 
stronger protection for intellectual property rights in the “new economy environment” to be a self-evident 
proposition.  That is because the 1991 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court (in the case of Feist 
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co. ) removed the remaining shreds of legitimacy draped around 
the argument that the producer of a database was entitled to the protections of copyright law on the basis   
of the sheer “sweat of the brow” effort invested in the activity of compilation, regardless of whether such 
investment had involved a significantly original, creative achievement.
20 
   
Performance of US Database Industry post Feist v. Rural Telephone (1991) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
      Performance indicators         1991        1997        % change 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Number of databases          7,637    10,338      35% 
Number of files within databases (billions)      4.0        11.2    180%   
Number of online searches (millions)       44.4     (88.1)      98% 
Private sector’s share in number of databases     *       0.70     0.78 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 Note: * The private sector￿s share in 1977 was 0.22. 
Source: http://www.databasedata.org/hr1858/legalprt/hegalprt.html.   
Both before and following the 1991 Feist ruling, copyright applied to the original selection, co-
ordination, and arrangement of data within a database; many defendants in the U.S. therefore have been 
found liable for copyright infringement since 1991. Industry proponents of sui  generis legislative 
protection voiced alarm that comprehensive electronically stored databases, being works of especially 
“low authorship” and containing material that was in the public domain, would not meet the standard set 
by copyright law; that there was a compelling need in this case – as elsewhere – to modify existing IPR 
institutions to protect incentives for productive investments in this form of information asset from being 
undermined by “electronic piracy” in the new technological environment that the convergence of digital 
computing and advanced telecommunications had created.   
Just how limited was the lost “sweat of the brow” protection for database producers could not be 
so readily perceived by observers who were not steeped in the intricacies of the U.S. courts’ treatment of 
copyright infringement claims.  Nor was it evident to inexpert participants in the debates over the 
significance of the Feist ruling that most of the databases of substantial commercial valuable (i.e., those 
really worth “pirating’) contain many linked fields, and the selection and arrangement of data in these is a 
sufficiently complex task to constitute some minimal level of creativity on the part of the author. U.S. 
copyright law clearly prevents the wholesale copying of such (non-trivial) database structures, and thus 
affords their publishers significant protection even in the post-Feist era.  These points were still less 
discernable to spectators in Europe, among them the members of the European Commission’s High-Level 
Expert Group who, at just that point in time, were considering policies to promote the development of 
“the Information Society.”
21  
                                                            
20 The practical importance of the ￿sweat of the brow￿ argument for the legal protection of database investors in the US 
has tended to be exaggerated. Legal opinion divided on the question, but, as Maurer and Scotchmer (1999, n.3) have 
noted, courts in New York and California -- the two main jurisdictions where intellectual property litigation traditionally 
occurred -- did not accept this argument for extending copyright to databases.   Both before and following the 1991 Feist 
ruling, copyright applied to the original selection, co-ordination, and arrangement of data within a database; many 
defendants in the U.S. therefore have been found liable for copyright infringement since 1991. See Stephen M. Maurer 
and Suzanne Scotchmer, ￿Database protection: Is it broken and should we fix it?￿ Science 284 (14 May) 1999: pp. 1129-
1130.    
21 The background of the EC Directive is discussed in P. A. David,  ￿A Tragedy of the Public Knowledge ￿Commons￿?--
Global Science, Intellectual Property and the Digital Technology Boomerang,￿ Forthcoming in Research Policy, Special 
Issue on IPR Protections￿ Impact on Scientific Research, edited by P. A. David and B. H. Hall. (Available 
on:<http:siepr.stanford.edu/wpapers/index.html>).    
 
 Yet, had they looked more closely at the prevailing business practices, the High-Level Group 
would have discovered that a wide variety of other appropriation devices was available and was being 
successfully deployed by U.S. database businesses.
22 In the case of the so-called “full text” databases, 
which often consist entirely of copyrighted documents, the contents do not lose their protected status by 
virtue of having been incorporated into a database. Another appropriation device available under existing 
law is the use of copyrighted enhancements: databases frequently are sold in a package along with 
advanced software. Because software is copyrightable (and in some instances patentable), would-be 
database copiers must either try to market a version of the material that is likely to be less useful, or make 
their own investment in developing search tools to package with the copied contents. 
 
 Furthermore, technical database firms in the U.S. were availing themselves of a variety of “self 
help” protections against free-riding. Custom and semi-custom databases prepared for a small number of 
users provide virtually automatic protection against third parties, and, more generally, contracts between 
the owners of such databases and their customers which limit the latter’s right to use and/or disclose the 
contents to third parties are enforceable as trade secrets, even where the underlying information and data 
cannot qualify for statutory protection. 
 
  Where information was distributed to larger numbers of customers, the industry availed itself of 
the use of “shrinkwrap” and “clickwrap” licences, search-only and password protected websites, and the 
frequent updating of contents, editing and enhancements of search facilities – all of which are especially 
valuable to researchers in rapidly changing branches of science. Besides these means, Stephen Maurer’s 
(1999) survey of industry practice found that “a significant number of products are sold without any 
protection at all, sometimes for comparatively high prices.” The explanation offered is that large vendors 
can afford to circulate catalogues that enable them to reach a small number of customers who are 
prepared to pay high prices for comparatively obscure titles, whereas the smaller would-be copiers cannot 
afford the expense of trying to bring their wares to the attention of those same purchasers.  
 
Thus, there was little if any substance to the rationale that was produced by the EC’s High-Level 
Expert Group in their 1992 draft Directive, which called upon the Member States of the EU to implement 
statutory protections for intellectual property in the form of databases: their argument was that such 
protection was needed to “level the playing field” so that European database creators could compete on 
less disadvantageous terms with their American counterparts.  
 
 
The EU’s Sui Generis Property Right in Databases and Its Implications 
 
A new and quite unexpected direct threat to the academic research enterprise in science and 
engineering thus emerged in mid-1990's, as a result of the extension of sui generis copyright protection to 
databases, even to databases containing non-copyrightable material. This institutional innovation 
crystallized in the European Union Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases (issued March 11, 
1996). It enjoined member states to create a new broadly comprehensive type of intellectual property that 
was free from a number of the important and long-standing limitations and exceptions traditionally 
provided by copyright law, in order to safeguard access to information used in socially beneficial, 
knowledge-creating activities such as research and teaching. The EU Database Directive applies equally 
                                                            
22 See Stephen M. Maurer, ￿Raw Knowledge: Protecting Technical Databases for Science and Industry.￿ Report 
Prepared for the NRC Workshop on Promoting Access to Scientific and Technical Data for the Public Interest, (1999): 
pp. 19-21.  
   
to non-electronic and electronic databases, even though, as will be seen, it originated as a strategic 
“industrial policy” response to the commercial development of on-line (electronic) databases in America. 
Further, as a device to secure international acceptance of the new approach initiated by this 
directive (which remains binding upon the member states of the European Union, in the sense of requiring 
implementation in each of their national statutes) reciprocity provisions were included. The latter in effect 
threatened the commercial creators of databases who were nationals of foreign states outside the EU with 
retaliatory infringement of copyright material in their products, unless their respective governments 
became signatories to a World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) draft convention on databases 
which had been framed to embody the essential provisions of the sui generis copyright protection 
established under the1996 EU Directive.
23 
The European Commission’s strategy succeeded in setting in motion an Administration-initiated 
legislative response in the U.S. Congress, which has now led to two competing draft statutes being 
actively debated. The response began in May 1996 with the introduction at the behest of the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office of House of Representatives of a bill, H.R. 3531, short-titled the “Database 
Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996.” This first and ill-considered rush to 
legislate soon encountered opposition from the U.S. academic research community and non-commercial 
publishers of scientific information. But although that attempt proved unavailing, the legislative genie has 
been let out of the bottle, with the result that the 104
th Congress presently has before it two further pieces 
of proposed legislation. The first of these is “The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act,” H.R. 345, 
which was introduced in January 1999 and represents a re-incarnation of the quite pernicious approach 
taken in the original Administration-inspired legislative proposal in 1996. A second bill, “The Consumer 
and Investors Access to Information Act,” H.R. 1858, was introduced in May 1999, and contains 
provisions protecting access to database information that are rather more responsive to the objections 
raised during 1997 against H.R. 3531. This too failed to gain support in the Senate, but its proponents 
have promised to try once again in the new session of Congress.  
A rapid review of the main features of the EC’s Database Directive of 1996 highlights the 
following problematic points:
24  
  The Directive’s sui generis approach departs from the long established principles of 
intellectual property law by removing the distinction between protection of expression and protection 
of ideas, a distinction that is central in US copyright law and was embodied in the TRIPS agreement 
adopted by the WTO. 
  Compilers of databases in the EU will now be able to assert ownership and demand 
payment for licensing the use of content, which already is in the public domain, including material 
that otherwise could not be copyright-protected. In complying with the Directive, member states will 
not be providing any specific incentives for the generation of new database content (such as scientific 
data and information, for example), as distinguished from new compilations. Nor can it be thought 
that copyrights in databases are being granted as part of a social bargain, in exchange for the public 
disclosure of material that hitherto was not revealed. 
                                                            
23 The 1996 draft was entitled: ￿Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in 
Respect of Databases...￿, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC, Geneva, August 30. It has been pointed out that in this regard, as 
well as in others, the EU Directive called for a departure from the principle of administering commercial laws on a 
￿national treatment￿ basis, under which a country￿s domestic laws (whether for intellectual property production, or 
unfair business practices) should treat foreign nationals like one of the country￿s citizens. The principle of national 
treatment is embodied in Article 3 of the TRIPs Agreement, as well as more generally in the Paris Convention (on 
patents and trademark protection) and the Berne Convention (on copyright protection). Objections to this departure 
were recorded in the testimony of the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Commerce (Andrew J. Pincus), in the 
106th Congress House Hearings on H.R. 1858 (1999): section F. 
24 The following draws upon the documented legal analysis in National Research Council (1997), pp. 148-153.   
  A second distinction fundamental in copyright law, that between original expressive 
matter and pre-existing expressive matter, has been discarded by language of the Directive, because 
the latter fails to attach any legal significance to the difference between expressive matter that already 
exists in the public domain, and matter that is original and newly disclosed. Domestic laws and 
national courts that reaffirm this omission in effect will allow a database maker to qualify for renewal 
of the 15-year term of exclusive rights over the database as a whole – by virtue of having made a 
“significant investment” in updates, additions, revisions.
25 
  Strict limitations upon re-use of database contents are imposed by the Directive, requiring 
third party regeneration or payment for licenses to extract such material. This would inhibit 
integration and recombination of existing scientific database contents with new material to provide 
more useful, specialized research resources. 
  But regardless of whether or not it is possible in theory to regenerate the raw contents of 
a database from publicly available sources, under the terms of the Directive, investors in database 
production can always deny third parties the right to use pre-existing data in value-added applications, 
even when the third parties are willing to pay royalties on licenses for such use. It would therefore be 
possible for an initial database producer simply to block subsequent creation of new, special-purpose 
databases which reproduced parts of existing compilations, wherever the regeneration of such data de 
novo was infeasible or terribly costly (as in the case of years of remote-sensing satellite observations, 
or data-tracks from high energy particle collision detectors, or multi-year bibliographic compilations 
of scientific publications and citations thereto).  
  Where a database maker also held the exclusive rights to license previously copyright-
protected publications, it would be entirely proper under the terms of the Directive to refuse third 
parties licenses in that material, while incorporating it within a database protected under the terms of 
the EC Directive. There are no compulsory licensing provisions under the Berne Convention on 
copyrights, and these are likewise excluded under the TRIPS Agreement. By following suit and 
excluding conditions for compulsory licensing, as well as omitting to provide remedies for abuse of 
the legal protections newly accorded to database investors, the Directive opens the door for the 
construction of indefinitely renewable monopolies in both non-re-generatable and non-re-generatable 
scientific data.  
  The Directive abandons the principle of “fair use” for research, as distinct from extraction 
and use of data for purposes of “illustration in teaching or research.” How “illustrative use” is to be 
interpreted remains ill defined, pending some infringement litigation that would provide opportunity 
for a court ruling in the matter. But the current consensus among IPR scholars is that “illustration” 
falls far short of the normal scope of research use of copyrighted material.   
The absence of fair use exclusions for research (and research training) creates the prospect of a 
two-way squeeze on public sector funded research programs, as the costs of obtaining commercially 
supplied data are likely to rise. The 10-fold rise in the unit prices of remote-sensing satellite images that 
immediately followed the privatization of LANSAT satellite operations in 1985, and its withering effects 
upon university-based research projects, might well be recalled in this connection.  Continuing pressures 
                                                            
25 See EC Directive on Databases, note 52, articles 7(1), providing an initial 15-year term from the date of completion; 
7(2) extending protection for an additional 15 years if the database ￿is made available to the public in whatever manner￿ 
before the initial term expires; 7(3) allowing 15-year renewals for ￿[a]ny substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or 
quantitatively, to the contents of a database￿from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, 
which ￿result in ￿a substantial new investment.￿ Under U.S copyright only the additions and revisions themselves ￿ 
which would be considered as ￿derivative work￿ from the prior original expressive matter ￿ would be entitled to fresh 
legal protection.    
   
for cuts in government budgets, and the priority that tends to be accorded to near-term applications-
oriented research vis-à-vis exploratory science, is likely to encourage derogation to commercial database 
generators of the function of compiling, updating and publishing databases that remain of continuing 
relevance for basic public sector research. There is a two-fold risk in this situation. One is the threat to 
data quality in the separating of the database creation and maintenance from the scientific expertise of the 
research community that creates and uses the data; the other is the resulting squeeze on public research 
resources, as already restrictive appropriations would have to be spent on purchasing data and database 
licenses. 
When considering the benefits to society of enabling the appropriation of the value of this facility 
(and ones like it in other research fields -- say, in developing new genetic diagnostic kits, or new drug 
therapies -- the question to be asked is what effect doing so will have on the probability of valuable 
discoveries both in the near term and over the longer run. Seeking to apply the rights granted by the EC’s 
Database Directive and restructure the “information space” so as to readily extract licensing fees from 
users, would have the predictable effect of curtailing searches that were not thought to have a high 
expectation of quickly finding something with high “applications value.” In other words, the probabilities 
of unexpected discoveries would be further reduced by the economically restricted utilization of the 
facility.  Targeted searches may be quite affordable, but wholesale extraction of the data-spaces’ contents 
to permit exploratory search activities is especially likely to be curtailed. 
The adverse influences of the consequent “lost discoveries” also are likely to ripple outwards. 
This is so because the development of new and more powerful search devices, and techniques of pattern 
recognition, statistical analysis, and so forth, are more likely to figure among the discoveries that would 
be made collectively through the exploratory use of facility by a larger number of searchers. Therefore, 
some cost of extracting economic rents from this construct today will most likely come in the form of 
smaller benefits (and the sacrifice of reduced applications-oriented research costs) in the future. In 
addition, one should consider the possibly serious inhibiting effect of setting up a “model” of IPR 
exploitation of such structures upon the construction of some new, presently unimagined information 
tools that would require the assembly (and licensing) of myriad information components from many, 
diverse sources.  
A concrete illustration of the creative power of collaborations built to exploit enhanced digital 
technologies is provided by the vast, multi-dimensional “information space” that has been built up over 
the course of many years by the research community whose activities are coordinated today by the 
European Bioinformatics Institute (EBI). This “virtual library” is a dynamic collective research tool rather 
than a simple repository of information. The ordinary conceptualization of “a database” is too static, and, 
in a sense too pre-structured, to comprehend the potential for discoveries that has been created by this 
collective construct. Yet, as the EBI’s Director has testified, this information space began to be formed 
long before the research communities involved gave any consideration to intellectual property right 
restrictions on the use of the information contents that were being linked for subsequent retrieval and 
analysis. The implication was clear that it would be far more difficult in today’s environment to create 




Reconsidering the Traditional Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection  
 
The advent of technologies that have greatly reduced both the fixed and the variable the costs of 
reproduction and transmission of information elicited strong defensive reactions from business publishing 
                                                            
26 See Statement by Graham Cameron, in IPR Aspects of Internet Collaborations, European Commission -- DG Research, 
Strata Programme Working Group Report, EUR 19456, Brussels ( April ) 2001.   
interests that previously enjoyed a measure of protection from their possession of superior, decreasing 
cost production facilities.  It was said that unrestricted use of plain paper photocopiers in the hands of 
readers threatened the profitability of conventional publishers. But, more careful economic analysis has 
shown that such is not necessarily the case; indeed, just the opposite might be true.   
Under the traditional analysis of the social efficiency of copyright, it was held that stringent 
protection against unauthorized copying could social as well as private losses from underutilization of the 
intellectual asset, where  the cost to consumers of obtaining an unauthorized copy was greater than they 
would be charged by a copyright holder who had a strict, enforceable monopoly. This is tantamount to the 
conclusion that strengthening copyright protection could enhance social welfare even without stimulating 
the production of new works of authorship, so long as lax restraints on copying resulted in the demand for 
authorized copies ("originals") being reduced greatly in relation to total consumption of the work in 
question.
27  
But, those arguments rested crucially on the supposition that the private cost to the consumer of 
obtaining a close substitute by copying an authorized "original" was greater than the copyright 
monopolists' marginal costs.  As Liebowitz (1985) pointed out, however, the latter assumption was in 
many situations been invalidated by advances in copying technologies. The complementarity in 
production between authorized "originals" and low-cost copies could mean (under conditions in which the 
demand demand for copies of such works was sufficiently price elastic) that a more permissive law 
regarding copying -- by allowing utilization of highly efficient copying technology -- actually could 
increase the effective demand for "originals" as well.  
Furthermore, it turns out that the best way for business to exploit the potential monopoly power 
conveyed by legal protections for “intellectual property” is not always that of trying to extract the 
maximum consumer surplus from each individual user. Even traditional “content owners” of information 
goods such as books, video-recordings, CD’s, software programs, and the like may be able to reap greater 
profits by allowing “sharing” (the free copying for use) of information goods among certain groups of 
consumers. The candidate groups would be those whose members were closely integrated socially, and 
whose collective willingness to pay exceeded the sum of their individual revealed demands for the 
commodity in question.
28 
 This represents an important qualification of the widely asserted claim that digitally assisted, low 
marginal cost reproduction encourages “piracy” (unlicensed copying and redistribution) which must be 
injurious to copyright holders, and therefore warrants introduction of stronger protections against all 
unauthorized copying. In the context of the present discussion, therefore, it is especially appropriate to 
point out that spatially distributed scientific and engineering research networks are in a sense 
paradigmatic of the self-selected producer groupings whose information goods requirements might be 
more profitably met by publisher/vendors who permitted, or actually facilitated free (intra-group) 
sharing.
29  
                                                            
27 See I.E. Novos, and M. Waldman, "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytical Approach," Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 92, 1984: pp.236-246; W.R. Johnson, "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 93, 1985: pp.158-174, for these two argument, respectively.  
28 See further discussion in P. A. David, ￿A Tragedy of the Public Knowledge ￿Commons￿? (2000: pp. 19ff), referring to 
Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson and Douglas Lichtman, ￿Shared information goods,￿ University of Chicago Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 67 (2nd Series), February, 1999, and forerunners in this vein. 
29 Moreover, in ￿the knowledge society￿ ￿ where collaborative generation of new ideas and practices is expected to 
characterized a larger and large segment of business activity, the scientific research network, conceived of as a form of 
￿competence based club,￿ may become a paradigm for an economically much larger part of the market for information-
goods that are research inputs.   
 The key condition for arguments of this sort is that allowing customers to “bundle themselves” 
into such consumer units permits increased aggregate sales, so long as the groups are “natural clubs” – 
like families, and scientific research teams – that organized themselves for some other purpose than 
spreading the fixed costs of acquiring access to the copyable information product.  But, in actuality, the 
restrictions on group membership could be dispensed with in technological circumstances that restricted 
the ease of producing copies; where the latter were embedded in physical medium, such as a printed book, 
publishers could benefit from the formation of club-like organizations that aggregated individual 
consumer demands effective “bundles.” The English book trade thus came eventually to take tolerant, and 
even appreciative view of the local commercial circulating libraries that arose during the 18
th century to 
cater to the growth of demand for popular literature.
30   
 It is said that economists are the sorts of scientists who like to show that things that are observed 
to work in practice also can work in theory. So it is reassuring that the experience of commercial 
circulating libraries conforms with the result of microeconomic models that demonstrated that lax 
restraints on copying (or free sharing) could be compatible with profitable publishing.  But, more recent, 
and more intricate theoretical arguments have raised rather more profound challenges to the traditional 
rationale for copyright protection in the digital information age.  In an pioneering and mathematically 
elegant dynamic general equilibrium analysis, Boldrin and Levine (2002) show that even in the absense of 
any restrictions on the re-copying of a new information good – restrictions that legal owners of copyright 
are permitted to impose on their customers and licensees -- competitive markets can support a socially 
efficient equilibrium in the production of information assets, and in the intertemporal flows of 
consumption utilities these yield.
31  
The underlying idea here is that although unrestricted copying eventually will drive the price of 
the marginal copy to zero, this doesn’t happen so rapidly; even if new technology has made copying rapid 
and essentially costless at the margin, Boldrin and Levin point out that consumption use may degrade the 
reproduction rate, and the supply of copies cannot instantly undergo infinite expansion.  Hence, the 
possessor of a “first copy,” i.e., the original instance of the intellectual or cultural work, has an asset that 
can command a positive price under competitive conditions. Its price reflects the present value of the 
future flow of marginal utilities that subsequent copies will yield to impatient consumers. Thus, the notion 
that the infinite expansibility of information, by permitting “free-riding” on the part of consumers, would 
leave the producer of the first copy with nothing for her efforts, is unjustifed because the process takes 
time, and there is a value to reading the best seller, or the latest DNA sequence sooner, rather than later. 
Still more recently, this line of analysis has been taken a very significant step farther by  Danny 
Quah (2002) : it turns out that the ability of competitive equilibrium prices to support the socially efficient 
dynamic allocation – maximizing the present value of the future stream of consumers utilities – survives 
the complete removal of all the restrictions that copyright law (and analogous sui generis legal protections 
for works of “low authorship’) allows possessors of “the first copy” to impose upon licensed users.
32 
Whereas in the analysis of Boldrin and Levine the terms of the weaken license permits purchasers to 
make copies only for future consumption purposes, Quah’s analysis shows that the first copy can 
command a positive value even when those copies can be sold in competition with the copies being 
                                                            
30 See Richard Roehl and Hal R. Varian, ￿Circulating Libraries and Video Rental Stores,￿ First Monday, 6(5), 2000. 
Available from: www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_5/roehl/index.html#r8. 
31 Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, ￿The case against intellectual property,￿ American Economic Review, 92 (May), 
2002; Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, ￿Perfectly competitive innovation,￿ Staff Report 303, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis, March 2002. 
32 Danny Quah, ￿24/7 Competitive Innovation,￿ LSE Working Paper, April 2002. Available from: 
<http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/quah>.   
supplied by the holder of the original instantiation of the information good – so long as the rate at which 
copies can be generated remains bounded from above.
33  
Commercial database firms in the US appear to have understood at least one facet of the 
economic reality that is reflected in these theoretical propositions. Copyright, or other legal protections of 
the content of their data bases was not necessary for them to run profitable businesses, in part because 
they could charge a premium to customers who wanted access to early updates of the contents, and not 
have to restrict them putting the information they extracted into other, equally unprotected databases.
34   
To be sure, these results do not go so far as to say that the competitive market valuation of the “first copy” 
always would be sufficiently large to cause every possible information asset to be created. The cost of the 
creative effort may be too large, but, then we do not ask competitive markets for conventional 
commodities to provide them even when the cost of doing so exceeds what the utility maximizing 
consumers would be willing to pay.  
Viewed from vantage point of these deepening doubts about the old rationale for legal 
monopolies in readily copyable and ubiquitously share-able information goods, the current rush to tighten 
the copyright regime and encourage strict enforcement of “anti-piracy” provisions of all kinds, may at 
some date in the not-so-distant future come to be perceived as having been a serious mistake. This is so 
not only because it will turn out to have been unnecessary for the socially efficient production and 
distribution of an increasingly important class of commodities in the New Economy, or because it will 
have consequences that were were injurious to the conduct of open science. Those will be bad enough, 
but policy makers are likely to suffer more obloquy if it begins to be evident that their enthusiasm for 
entrenching the all the old IPR institutions was antithetical to the development and exploitation of new 
and more profitable business opportunities. This prospect is not merely a fantasy. 
Among at least some leading innovators concerned with the future trajectory of e-commerce, 
there is growing recognition that the conventional regime of proprietary controls over the use of 
information by industry may hinder to exploitation of new profit opportunities being created by digital, 
networked technology. Within the domain of Internet based media industries, a new landscape of what are 
referred to as ‘peer to peer’ (P2P) services has emerged, featuring shared storage, shared information and 
shared processing.  The new P2P applications devolve significant autonomy and control to independent 
nodes in the network; they capitalize on under-utilized network-connected computing resources at the 
edge of the network; they operate as transparent end-to-end services across an Internet of uneven and 
temporary connections. One vision of the future sees the greater effectiveness of this comparatively 
unstructured and self-organized mode of producing and delivering new information to individual users as 
the basis for new and competitive commercial services; that these will challenge the incumbency of 
traditional business forms in information-intensive production and distribution activities. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, spokespersons for P2P business applications have been worried by the 
threat that proprietary standards strategies on the part of platform vendors would create barriers to 
collaborative computing, in just the same way that scientists engaged in distributed Internet projects 
worry about IPR-created barriers to the flow of information, and the diminishing future prospects for easy 
                                                            
33 The quickening rate of copying that Quah￿s (2002) analysis contemplates is alluded to by the reference to ￿24/7-time￿ 
￿ the continuous, ￿round the clock every day of the week￿ pace at which the Internet permits economic activity to run. In 
the limit, where copying becomes infinitely rapid, Quah finds that the intuition of the traditional economic argument 
that competitive markets will fail is regained. The first copy (asset price) and the price of the marginal consumption flow 
both go to zero.  
34 As has been pointed out US database firms also provide a variety of complementary services, including efficient and 
rapid search algorithms, which also contribute to the profitability of their operations in the absence of intellectual 
properly protection for the database contents.    
voyages of exploration in “information space.”  Here is Esther Dyson’s formulation of the threat to P2P, 
and a possible means of avoiding it:
35  
“The growth of P2P services will be retarded if this world fragments into warring proprietary 
platforms, forcing users to make unpalatable choices and killing synergistic network effects. 
Some existing proposed standards fit naturally into P2P models, including simple object access 
protocol (SOAP) and universal discovery description and integration (UDDI)…. At some point 
it will make sense to have at least de facto standards for common P2P elements. Standards 
bodies [which under ANSI rules preclude adoption of proprietary specifications that are not 
freely licensed] provide a place for industry participants to gather, compare notes, identify 
shared challenges and find common ground.” 
At the 2001 Economic World Forum meeting in Davos, Switerzland, Richard Li, executive 
Chairman of Pacific Century CyberWorks, is reported to have voiced essentially the same worries:
36 “his 
biggest concern about the development of broadband technology was the conservatism of many content 
providers who were determined to retain copyright protection and unwilling to consider creative new 
business models.‘That element is probably the missing slice -- for the time being’.”  Significantly enough, 
the emerging P2P approach to network-based computing and computer-mediated telecommunications 
services, and the demonstrated capacity of that non-hierarchical form of machine organization to mobilize 
distributed intelligence for the rapid solution of new problems, has strong elements of homomorphism 
with the historical functioning of “invisible colleges” in the open science domain.
37  
What has changed, of course, is the qualitative effects of the technological capacity to link 
“distributed intelligent resources” in a host of differentiated sub-communities at negligible cost; and to 
thus provide spectacularly rapid capabilities of searching the “information spaces” thereby created.  What 
hitherto was the peculiar organizational facility for discovery and invention that the commercially 
unpressured pace of open scholarly inquiry afforded practitioners of “open science” may become a much 
more widely relevant mode of generating innovative information-goods that customers are willing to pay 
for.  
The transformation that appears to be bringing the world of P2P network-based commerce and the 
world of “invisible colleges” of academic inquiry into closer alignment with regard to their working 
modalities is certainly an intriguing development, and one that is potentially promising for the future 
synergetic interactions between those two spheres of human endeavor. It stands in much greater need of 
concerted public policy support than the present impetus being given to the negotiation of university-
industry collaborative research agreements whose IPR provisions accede to the monopoly-protecting 
strategies familiar to conventional R&D-intensive businesses in the chemical, pharmaceutical and electro-
mechanical engineering industries.  
My point in drawing attention to the parallels between the organization of open-science 
communities, and the information-intensive strategies emerging in the domain of cyber-commerce is 
simply this: policy-makers in the industrially advanced country, and those in other regions who are 
echoing their views may be making a serious error in pressing university- and public institute- based 
research groups to involve themselves in conventionally securing and “managing” proprietary rights to 
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36 ￿Industry Leaders See a New Era in the Tech Revolution,￿ International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2001, pp. 1,16. 
37 See P.A. David, ￿Communication norms and the collective cognitive performance of ￿Invisible Colleges￿,￿ in Creation 
and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and Incentives, Eds. G. B. Navaretti et al., New York and Berlin: Physical Verlag, 1997; 
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the use of new knowledge.  However fashionable this current policy trend may be at present, those 
subscribing to it may be found to have been trying to ride the wave of the past -- at the expense of 
building the wave of the future.  In actuality, if such efforts to create “wealth from knowledge through 
IPR” succeeded, the result might be to have rendered more difficult their economies’ eventual 
development of novel kinds of computer-network intensive service organizations, and the other new lines 
of e-business to which those would lead.   
Rather than seeing “open science” communities as asserting claims that stand in the way of the 
exploration and exploitation of profitable business opportunities built on exclusive ownership and control 
of digital content, their characteristic mode of disclosure and data-sharing might well be regarded as a 
precursor and paradigm of future “New Economy” activities that will fully exploit the potentialities 
opened by the Internet.  To put this thought in proper historical perspective, the ethos and mode of 
organization that has been associated historically with publicly supported scientific work groups (at least 
since the 17
th century), now could be coming into its own as the basis for new forms of commercial 
activity feasible in the Digital Age. This certainly is what some observers of the open source software 
movement now suggest.
38 What policy-making for economic development in the 21
st century ought to 
consider carefully, therefore, is how to avoid promoting an entrenchment of durable IPR protections 
regime that could fatally obstruct that evolution. 
 
Modest Proposals: IPR Policies to Preserve the Public Knowledge Commons 
 
What sort of intellectual property arrangements will be best suited to the social efficient 
exploitation of the production and consumption possibility emerging in the “weightless economy,” and to 
the construction of the “digital information spaces” in which globally collaborative programs of discovery 
and invention are likely to flourish? 
The policy position on copyright and copyright-like protections of intellectual property that I 
have advanced on previous occasions, and continue to advocate here is of the meliorist, rather than the 
radical variety.
39 This is not because I am not attracted by the elegance of the idea of creating a positive 
right to “fair use” of legally protected information, and research tools, for educational and research 
purposes.  One might be tempted to think along such lines by the recent indications that WIPO is aware of 
the existence of a connection between intellectual property and human rights. The joint panel discussion 
organized by WIPO and the Office of United National High Commission for Human Rights, to 
commemorate the 50
th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  addressed issues such 
as biodiversity, the production of traditional (ethnic) knowledge and innovation, the right to culture, 
health, non-discrimination, and scientific freedom. Another possible straw in the wind is to be seen in 
article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prescribes the right to freedom of speech 
as protecting not only the positive right to expression, but the right to receive information. Yet the 
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involvement of human rights counts in intellectual property law is likely to be a distant and incremental 
evolution, if it happens at all. It therefore seems expedient to attend to less far-reaching means of 
improving the present state of affairs. 
Developed and developing economies alike have a shared interest in halting, and, if possible 
reversing the trend toward the further strengthening and extension of property rights regime to every 
conceiveable form of “information.” My convictions in this regard have crystallised as a response to the 
prospective implications of European Union’s database legislation, the proposals for similar sui generis 
protections that were surfaced in the US Congress, and the likelihood that the European Commission soon 
will follow the US in introducing new criminal law sanctions to reinforce the effectiveness of digital “self 
help” technologies such as watermarking and encryption. These institutional changes appear to me as last-
ditch efforts to entrench an approach to intellectual property rights that is being rendered increasingly 
obsolete by the technological developments that are driving “the New Economy.”  Yet, worse than 
exemplifying ingenious adaptations to preserve the workability of an old legal regime, the continuation of 
this trend may seriously curtail the benefits developed and developing societies alike are able to derive 
from vastly expanded access to scientific, technological and cultural knowledge. 
  When considering the available courses of action to counter threats to the pursuit of knowledge 
arising from recent innovations intended to strengthen intellectual property protections, distinctions of 
two kinds help to simplify the discussion, although not the problems that need to be addressed.  Firstly, 
there is an obvious difference between the altered terms and the scope of statutory intellectual property 
protections, on the one hand, and on the other hand, legislative steps designed to reinforce the use of 
technologies of “self help” that enable copyright owners to more perfectly control the dissemination of 
digital content (whether that is legally protected or not).  A second distinction has to be drawn between 
the situation of countries where legislative innovations affecting intellectual property may be under 
consideration, and those cases in which such statutes already are faits acomplis -- so that the questions of 
practical interest concern implementation and enforcement. 
 
  For most of the nations of the world, the appropriate recommendations in regard to both the 
technological and the legal measures that would restrict access to digital data used for research and 
training would seem to follow Nancy Reagan’s admonition to youths who  are offered the opportunity to 
experiment with addictive drugs: “Just say ‘No’!” It is relevant that this option remains one that is open to 
all the countries, developed and developing alike, that are signatories to the TRIPS Agreement, and, of 
course to those who have not yet joined the WTO. To date, at least, there is no international convention in 
force for the legal protection of databases and the articles of the TRIPS Agreement do not pertain to 
database protection per se. Thus, unless a case were successfully to be made for interpreting the sui 
generis protections for databases created by the EC Directive of March 11, 1996 as somehow being 
covered under copyright, nothing in the TRIPS agreements would oblige other nations to follow the 
(misdirected) leaders in this particular regard. Such an interpretation, moreover, would be utterly 
tendentious in view of the numerous respects in which the terms of the EC Database Directive has been 
seen to deviate from the principles embraced by national and international copyright law. 
 
  Much the same general position may be advanced in regard to the possible products of the 
legislative drive to provide legal reinforcement for technological measures of “self help” on the part of 
copyright owners. As has been noted previously, the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998) 
includes language making it illegal to furnish -- whether by importation or manufacture, and whether by 
sale or free distribution -- all means of circumventing “any technological measure that effectively controls 
access” to a copyrighted work. As dubious, and in some respects as counter-productive as these sections 
of the DMCA have been found to be, by both legal and technical experts,
40 it remains quite conceivable 
                                                            
40  On  the question of ￿counter-productive￿ effects, Dam (1998) notes the testimony by cyptography experts to the 
effect that the wording of the 1998 DMCA (U.S. Code, 17, §1201) would make it illegal even to devise and distribute   
that an effort will be made to press other countries into following suit.  In an immediate sense, however 
the issue in this case is not one of legal principle, but instead belongs to the wider and unresolved debate 
about the feasibility and desirability of uniform international standards of enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. 
 
  Nothing presently compels countries that are signatory to the TRIPS Agreement to arrive at 
uniformity in the degree of enforcement of their intellectual property laws.  It is true that the international 
conventions and laws governing patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, industrial designs, 
semiconductor mask works, and still protections, all must be “effectively implemented and enforced” by 
each of the nations belonging to the WTO. Nevertheless, the term “effectively” remains subject to 
considerable variations in interpretation.
41  In addition, the Agreement explicitly recognizes several bases 
for exemptions from the provisions made for protection of the rights of owners of intellectual property, 
including appeal to “fair use” or “public interest” (Articles 13, 17,24,27:2, 30 and 37). Inasmuch as 
national governments under the Agreement retain the right to create a haven for “fair use” of protected 
intellectual property in the public interest, it may be argued that their ability to effectively exercise that 
right would be impeded by requiring that they prevent their own nationals from circumventing 
unilaterally imposed access blocking technologies in order to avail themselves of those “fair use” 
exemptions for those very same scientific research and training purposes.  
 
   The foregoing remarks obviously apply to the situation in which the developing economies find 
themselves with respect to intellectual property protections that would have seriously inhibited worthy, 
“public interest” activities, had not the latter gained statutory exemptions under the laws’ provisos for 
“fair use.” It remains an interesting question as to whether it sphere of applicability extends still farther: 
could it also encompass retroactive remedial legislative actions on the part of the economically advanced 
member states of the EU that have not yet implemented the EC Directive on the Legal Protection of 
Databases in their national laws?  Whereas some countries, such as the United Kingdom, were quick to 
implement the Directive without entering any exceptions or liberalizing interpretations, others European 
states, such as the Netherlands as well as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, have not rushed to 
comply with its terms. This has opened a window for attempts to modify the Directive’s force by suitable 
interpretations in the way it is implemented. But, rather than leaving it to individual members to 
undertake to ameliorate the harm that a literal acceptance and enforcement of the text of the Directive 
might do to the scientific research community in Europe, it would be far more satisfactory for the EC to 
now propose a “harmonized” set of fair use exemptions, as a minimal remedial step. 
 
  That solution, however, is most unlikely to emerge spontaneously, not even in the wake of the 
departure of EC Commissioner Bangemann, and the scandal-prompted reforms undertaken by the new 
leadership of EC President Roman Prodi; some very considerable amount of political pressure would have 
to be brought to bear upon the Commission, and a coalition formed among the smaller member states who 
have yet to implement the Directive would seem to be among the few plausible ways in which such 
pressure could materialize. Yet, in view of the politically fragmented condition of Europe’s basic science 
research communities, the prospects of an effective coalition emerging would remain rather remote unless 
it were to be energized by business corporations similar to those in the U.S. who have lobbied actively 
against counterpart database legislation. The political economy of the question, therefore is likely to turn 
not upon the longer-run implications for science and technology in Europe as the logic of economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
algorithms used in testing encryption systems by trying to defeat them., and, more generally would greatly impede 
research aimed at making such devices cheap and faster to apply.  This point nicely recapitulates the larger them that 
what the would-be protectors of technological innovation most frequency fail to grasp is that information is an input in 
the process of generating new knowledge. 
41 See Reichman (1998) on the interpretation of the enforcement articles included in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement, 
and the survey of implementation issues in Keely (2000).    
analysis might dictate, but instead upon whether or not there exists a significant section of European 
industry that comes to perceive a direct and immediate source of harm to their economic fortunes, in the 
extraordinary nature of the protections allowed by the EC’s Database Directive.  
 
The important broad principle to be established is a simple one: whatever are the legal rights that 
societies construct regarding “intellectual property,” whether under international patent and copyright 
regimes or by sui generis protections (inadvisable as these may be, on other grounds), the licensing terms 
available to “owners” should never be allowed to create inefficient artificial impediments to the intensive 
utilization of the contents of virtual archives and information tools. As I have suggested, this principle 
may be just as important for the future of new commercial ventures based upon computer-mediated 
telecommunications as it is for the health of fundamental, exploratory inquiries organized under the 
auspices of non-profit institutions. As has been noticed It also should be more widely recognized that 
such a principle is not necessarily deterimental to profitable enterprise in information-goods markets  
In the view of most economists, the “first best” allocation system in situations where goods are 
produced with high fixed costs but far lower marginal costs, is to apply what is known as the “Ramsey 
pricing” rule. This fits the case of information products such as scientific publication and data, where the 
first-copy costs are very great in relationship to the negligible unit costs of copies. Ramsey pricing in 
essence amounts to price discrimination between users whose demands are inelastic and those users for 
whom the quantity purchased is extremely price-sensitive. The former class of buyers therefore will bear 
high prices without curtailing the quantity purchased of the goods in question, and hence not suffer great 
reductions in consumption utility on that account, whereas the low prices offered to those in the second 
category will spare them the burden of economic welfare reducing cutbacks in their use of the good.  
The case might then be made for treating scholars and public sector, university-based researchers 
as having highly elastic information and data demands. Such a characterization would follow from 
considering that this category of knowledge-workers is employed on projects that have fixed budget 
allocations from public (or non-profit) entities, organizations that are expected to promote the interests of 
society at large. As there is strong complementarity between their data and information requirements, on 
the one hand, and on the other resources they use in their research, the effects of raising the real price of 
this input are tantamount to sharply reducing the quantity of useful work that such projects can 
accomplish so long as their budgets remain fixed. Obviously, there is no workable economic or political 
mechanism that would serve to “index” the nominal value of public research budgets on the prices of 
commercially provided data. Even were such mechanisms to be found, commitment to implement them 
on the part of the rich societies would most likely result in pricing the use of scientific information and 
data beyond the reach of many poorer societies. 
 The general thrust of the policy advocated here is thus quite simple: statutes that would establish 
legal ownership rights for compilers of scientific and technological databases also should include 
provisions mandating compulsory licensing of scientific database contents at marginal costs (of data 
extraction and distribution) to accredited individuals and research institutions. The implication is that the 
fixed costs should be covered by lump sum subscription charges, which would be waived in the case of 
researchers engaged in constructing and maintaining these databases under the auspices of publicly 
supported projects. 
A fully consistent, albeit still bolder, recommendation would have the same provisions apply 
more broadly. They could be extended to all the users of such data and information resources who agreed 
to distribute the data they generated on the same basis as that on which they had been able to access the 
data used in creating it. That universal application of the so-called “Copyleft” principle in the GNU 
General Public License leaves open the possibility to commercial ventures of licensing and direct 
marketing of ancillary and complementary goods and services. By such means the firms might coup the   
fixed costs of the contribution to the “information infrastructures” that they would participate with 
publicly sponsored researchers in helping to create.   
Further, and still more far-reaching reforms affecting patents on research tools follow from this 
approach. The first would institute a public policy of “patent buy-outs,” under which public tax revenues 
would be used to purchase the rights to this class of inventions, and place them in the public domain. A 
possible device to prevent confiscation of valuable patents at arbitary low compensation, or the award of 
an inappropriately high “prize” to the patentee, would take the form of the following provision: such 
inventions would be made legally subject to compulsory licensing at a “reasonable” royalty rate, and the 
(regulated) rights to the revenue stream would then be publicly auctioned, with the government standing 
ready to acquire the rights for the public domain by default if a pre-announced “reservation” price was 
attained by a private purchaser.  
It is true that there are some well known circumstances where significant patent protection might 
be warranted by the high fixed costs that public regulatory policies impose upon the private developers of 
innovative commodities that are readily “reverse engineered” and cheaply copied -- e.g., by the extensive 
field testing requirements for pharmaceutical products and medical devices. But, these represent the 
exception rather than the rule, and the end products themselves typically do not have the essential ‘public 
goods’ properties associated with information-good and information-tools.  Rather, it is the product 
safety-testing information regarding new pharmaceuticals, and other complex and potentially dangerous 
products that actually constitute the “public goods.”  Yet, even here it should be pointed out that a 
convincing economic case has still to be made for using legally constructed monopolies to solve the 




The American poet Robert Frost’s ode to individualism celebrates the stone fences that 
distinguish the rural landscape of upland New England: “good fences make good neighbors.”  Perhaps it 
is so, where the resource involved is land, onto which the livestock from neighboring farms otherwise 
may wander to graze and thereby destroy the provender of the animals already pastured there. But is it so, 
too, when one scientist pores over the data gathered by another? Simple consideration of the “public 
goods” nature of information tells us that such is not the case. 
Information is not like forage, depleted by use for consumption. Data-sets are not subject to being 
“over-grazed” but, instead, are likely to be enriched and rendered more accurate, and more fully 
documented the more that researchers are allowed to comb through them. It is by means of wide and 
complete disclosure, and the skeptical efforts to replicate novel research findings, that scientific 
communities collectively build bodies of “reliable knowledge.” Thus, there is good reason for hesitating 
to embrace “private property rights” as a universal panacea, for that is a system of resource allocation that 
has been found to work well in the domain of conventional commodities that are exhausted in the process 
of use and cannot be simultaneously enjoyed by many.  
By contrast, in the realm of knowledge, information and scientific data, an overly literal 
application of the metaphor of “property,” one that emphasizes the desirability of socially enforced rights 
to exclude trespassers and to alienate “commodities” by means of exchange, may lead towards perverse 
                                                            
42 Purely fiscal arguments would have to show the existence of socially more productive alternative uses of the claims on 
resources used (or with-held by their owners ) as a consequence of the state￿s reliance on general tax revenues to provide  
product- and process-safety information upon which to base its regulatory decisions. It might be noticed that there 
already is a specific (and hidden) form of  state subsidization of private investment in field trials of drugs and medical 
devises: in the UK, for example, the hospital and clincal facilities of the National Health Service are placed as the 
disposal of the researchers who conduct those trials on behalf of the commercial developers of the innovations.        
economic policies in the field of scientific and technological research. By its very nature, the alternative 
to proprietary research -- the pursuit of “open science” -- requires patronage from external sources of 
grant and contract funding, or from those who are personally engaged, and often from both. 
The central problems facing researchers in the developing countries are rooted in a lack of 
adequate material resources to pursue their work in the effective, open mode of cooperation with 
scientists throughout the world. Thus, it is tempting for them to think of embracing proprietary research 
as the solution to the income constraints under which they presently labor. The same thought will occur 
quite naturally to those who wish to help these less advantaged colleagues. After all, this course of “self-
help” in meeting the rising costs of modern scientific research demonstrably has proved attractive to the 
administrators of many far better endowed universities and public institutes in the industrially advanced 
regions – and also to individual researchers who see in it a means of further advancing both their work 
and their material standard of living. 
In the developed countries this course has provided, at best only a small margin of incremental 
research support, averaging 8-10 per cent among research universities in the US. Yet, in some fields, and 
particularly in the life sciences, where the share of funding from industrial sources approaches 25 per cent 
at the leading institutions, the commercialization movement is perceptibly encroaching upon the culture 
of academic research and challenging the ethos of collaborative, open science. Consequently, we must 
worry that applying the same “remedy” to mend the economic disabilities of open science in the 
developing countries would have more profound transforming effects, and might in the end result in 
further isolating researchers there from the remaining sources of cooperative exchange with publicly 
supported colleagues and institutions elsewhere.  Yes, in the private property rights system we have a 
readily prescribed and potentially potent “cure” for the condition of impoverished open science. 
Unfortunately, it is one in which the patients die.  We really do need to think of something better. 
 